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COMMENT

THE ILLUSORY CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF “NO
TRESPASSING” SIGNS IN
TENNESSEE
STATE V. CHRISTENSEN, 517 S.W.3D 60 (TENN. 2017).
Rainey Lankford*
In State v. Christensen,1 the Tennessee Supreme
Court decided whether police officers violated the
defendant’s constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures when the officers entered the
defendant’s property despite the presence of “No
Trespassing” signs. The court ruled that the officers’
entrance did not constitute a violation of the defendant’s
constitutional rights.2 Thus, the court upheld the ruling
of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, stating that
“No Trespassing” signs, alone, do not prohibit officers
J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The University of Tennessee
College of Law. B.A., Psychology, Lipscomb University, 2014,
cum laude. I would like to thank Dean Melanie Wilson, Dean
& Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of Law at The
University of Tennessee College of Law, for her instruction and
guidance in the study of criminal procedure.
1 517 S.W.3d 60, 68–69 (Tenn. 2017).
2 Id. at 63–64.
*
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from coming onto the curtilage of a home to conduct a
consensual knock-and-talk encounter. Therefore, the
ruling by the trial court, finding the defendant guilty,
was upheld.3
On August 3, 2013, two narcotics investigators
responded to a tip regarding a pseudoephedrine
purchase.4 The tip eventually led them to the defendant’s
home, which had a gravel driveway.5 Two “No
Trespassing” signs were posted at the entrance to the
driveway.6 Further, there were no physical obstructions
preventing entrance to the driveway.7 The defendant
came out to meet the investigators as they approached
his porch.8 When the defendant opened the door, the
investigators smelled the distinct odor that comes with
the production of methamphetamine.9 The officers then
spoke to the defendant and asked for consent to search
his home.10 The defendant told the investigators that he
had done nothing illegal and would not consent to the
search.11 At this point, the investigators determined that,
due to the present exigent circumstances (namely the
volatile
nature
of
the
chemicals
used
in
methamphetamine production), they had to enter the
home to investigate further.12 One investigator forced
open the locked door to the home and began searching.13
This initial entry led to the discovery of a
methamphetamine lab and several firearms.14
Id. at 79.
Id. at 64.
5 Id. at 65.
6 Id. at 67.
7 Id. at 64.
8 Id. at 65.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 66.
3
4
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At trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence gathered as a result of the warrantless
search of his home, claiming that the presence of a “No
Trespassing” sign meant that a warrant was required to
enter his property.15 The defendant’s motion was denied
and he was convicted of five separate criminal charges.16
Later, on direct appeal, the defendant contended that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
evidence found within his home.17 Conducting de novo
review, the court of appeals determined that the growing
legal consensus was that “the implied invitation of the
front door can be revoked but that the revocation must be
obvious to the casual visitor who wishes only to contact
the residents of a property.”18 Based on this
determination, the court of appeals found the presence of
a mere “No Trespassing” sign insufficient to revoke any
aforementioned implied invitation.19
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court began
its review by affirming the rights enshrined in the federal
and state constitutions forbidding warrantless searches
of homes and specific Fourth Amendment protections
against searches on the curtilage of one’s home.20 The
court pointed out, however, that not every police
interaction on the curtilage of one’s home constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.21 Citing the U.S.

State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015
Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14,
2015).
16 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 63.
17 Christensen, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357, at *7.
18 Id. at *13 (citing State v. Grice, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (N.C.
2015)).
19 Id.
20 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 68–69 (citing U.S. CONST. amend.
IV; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7). The court here “assume[d][]
without deciding” that the driveway was part of the curtilage
of the defendant’s home. Id. at 69.
21 Id. at 69.
15
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Florida v. Jardines,22 the court
recognized the right of police officers to approach the
curtilage of a home under “knock-and-talk” rules.23 It was
further established that “knock-and-talk” interactions
are not considered searches under the Fourth
Amendment; therefore, the question became whether the
defendant had revoked this implied invitation to “knockand-talk.”24
The issue of whether “No Trespassing” signs are
enough to revoke any implied license to “knock-and-talk”
has been the subject of many state and federal cases. 25
However, the majority of states have found that such
signs were not enough revoke an implied license to
“knock-and-talk.”26 The court specifically noted State v.
Rigoulot,27 which stated that “No Trespassing” signs
“cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude normal,
legitimate inquiries.”28 In order to determine when a “No
Trespassing” sign may be reasonably interpreted to
forbid “knock-and-talk” situations, the court turned to
the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carloss.29 The
court specifically pointed to a concurring opinion in
Carloss, in which Chief Judge Tymkovich said that the
Id. at 69–70 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409,
1415–16 (2013) (holding that while police officers have a
license to approach the home and knock, if they are engaging
in conduct that is clearly a search, around the curtilage, any
such evidence gathered as a result should be suppressed)).
23 Id. at 70 (citing State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2003)).
24 Id. (citing Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18).
25 Id. at 72 (citing cases).
26 Id. at 73 (citing cases).
27 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (stating that “No
Trespassing” signs are not enough to forbid normal legitimate
requests, and that police officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment if they enter the curtilage under these
circumstances).
28 Id. at 923.
29 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 2016).
22
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legal standard to be applied in these cases should be
whether a reasonable person, under a totality of the
circumstances, would view a “No Trespassing” sign as
something that would place any bearing on one’s ability
to go up to the curtilage of the home and knock.30 The
Tennessee Supreme Court adopted this totality of the
circumstances standard.31 In examining the totality of
the circumstances in the defendant’s case, the court
determined that the simple presence of “No Trespassing”
signs did not suffice to deter officers from approaching
the curtilage of his home.32 The court suggested, however,
that if the defendant’s driveway had been blocked by a
locked gate or a fence, then it would have been more clear
to the officers that any license to approach the home had
been revoked.33 No such barrier existed in the
defendant’s case.34 Based on this determination, the
court found that the defendant had no expectation of
privacy in regards to individuals approaching his home.35
Thus, the ruling of the trial court was upheld.36
The dissent rebuffed the court’s assertion that it
might take a locked fence or gate for a citizen to invoke
his Fourth Amendment rights.37 In writing the dissent,
Justice Sharon Lee pointed out that the court’s physical
barriers standard would leave poorer citizens without the
means to invoke their rights.38 Justice Lee further stated
that “No Trespassing” signs clearly state the property
owner’s desire to not have visitors.39 Many other
Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 74–75 (citing Carloss, 818 F.3d
at 999–1000).
31 Id. at 75.
32 Id. at 75–76.
33 Id. at 78–79.
34 Id. at 76–77.
35 Id. at 78.
36 Id. at 79.
37 Id. (Lee, J., dissenting).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 80.
30

[291]
6
5

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

jurisdictions have taken such a stance.40 One such
example is People v. Scott,41 where the New York Court of
Appeals declared that physical barriers and/or
appropriate signage was enough to make clear that entry
was not permitted by the property owner.42 However, the
dissent also considered the totality of the circumstances
standard set forth by the court.43 Justice Lee contended
that, even under the totality of the circumstances
standard, the defendant made it clear that he wanted no
visitors.44 Justice Lee argued that while the majority
claimed it was applying a totality of the circumstances
standard, it failed to actually weigh the significance of
the signs.45 Citing a case from the Maryland Court of
Appeals, Justice Lee contended that the presence of two
clearly visible “No Trespassing” signs was enough to
make it clear to the investigators that no one was
welcome to approach the home.46 Justice Lee also argued
that because the defendant had made clear that no one
was welcome on his property, he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy on his curtilage, and those
expectations were violated by the warrantless intrusion
by the investigators.47
Christensen will have an effect on homeowners
across the state of Tennessee by raising the bar for what
revokes the implied invitation for individuals to approach
the curtilage of their home and knock. Now, Tennesseans
must utilize a physical barrier, such as a locked fence or
gate, to put the public on notice that unsolicited visitors
are not welcome to approach their home. While this
See, e.g., id. at 80–81 (citing cases).
593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 (N.Y. 1992).
42 Id.
43 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 82 (Lee, J., dissenting).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. (citing Jones v. State, 943 A.2d 1, 12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2008)).
47 Id. at 83.
40
41

[292]
7
6

ILLUSORY CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 287 (2018)

ruling follows most other jurisdictions in making physical
barriers the standard for revocation of the implied
invitation to “knock-and-talk,” it still leaves some
questions. One such question is whether such a rule will
create a burden on lower income households that wish to
invoke their Fourth Amendment rights.48 It will be
important to follow future cases to see if there are any
disparities based on income. Another question is how
other courts will treat the varying rulings taken by
jurisdictions on this issue. While most jurisdictions have
adopted the same rule as Tennessee, others have chosen
the alternative.49 Until there is a significant divergence
on this issue in the federal courts, however, this area of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will likely remain one
governed by jurisdiction-specific rules.

48
49

See id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
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